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I. INTRODUCTION
The following is an attempt to describe some of the salient features
of the financing of projects by the World Bank Group,1 and particularly
the infrastructure portions thereof, in the mining sector. In order to
better understand the operating norms as well as the policies and prac-
tices which have underlined the Group's institutional approach to the
mineral industry in the past, a brief summary of the background, struc-
ture, and framework of these organizations is necessary. Absent this
explanation, the realities and the constraints of its operating norms
cannot be fully appreciated. As is well known, the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, commonly known as the IBRD
or World Bank, is the largest and oldest cooperative or multilateral
institution in the field of development finance. Its principal purposes are
expounded in its Articles of Agreement,' which is also its governing
charter. These purposes, which prescribe the limits of its operational
freedom, include: (1) assisting in the development of the economies of
its members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive
purposes, and (2) promoting private investment and, where private cap-
ital is not available on reasonable terms, financing productive projects
from its own resources. Finally, the Bank is directed to "conduct its
* Attorney, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. M. Jur., Jerusalem; D.
Phil., Oxon. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views
of the IBRD.
' The Group includes three financial institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the International Devel-
opment Association (IDA). The Group also includes one nonfinancial institution, the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
2 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec.
27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134.
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operations with due regard to the effect of international investment on
business conditions in the territories of its members. ' 3
The Bank is a cooperative stock corporation, whose shares are owned
by its 124 member governments. The more needy of these governments
are the beneficiaries of its loans. The Bank has a capital structure that
is designed to enable it, indeed to compel it, to obtain the bulk of its
loanable funds through borrowings in the private capital markets of the
world. This is because the Bank's articles provide that not more than
i0 percent of the Bank's subscribed capital may be used in its lending
operations. Nine-tenths of this 10 percent is not even freely usable for
loans in the case of the vast majority of members because their curren-
cies are not convertible. In effect, the balance constitutes a guarantee
fund to be called upon to meet the Bank's own borrowings or obliga-
tions. The amount of money which the Bank has borrowed since it was
founded is indeed staggering. For example, in the 6-year period ending
June 1974, borrowings reached almost $8.85 billion, an average of well
over $1.4 billion per annum. By far the major portion of the Bank's
outstanding obligations, i.e., its bonded debt, is held by private, institu-
+Jonal investors. Thus, the Bank's issuing activity is an important factor
in the mobilization of private capital for development finance.' It is the
confidence and support of these private investors which furnish the
funds for the Bank's operations and enable it to make its contribution
to the development process. While the Bank is authorized to guarantee
loans as well as to lend directly, it has never availed itself of these
guarantee powers (which would entail greater costs for borrowers) and
has confined itself exclusively to direct lending.
The Bank's ability to promote direct private investment has been
found to be considerably more limited. This inability is, inter alia, due
to the following factors: (1) the Bank is unable to take a risk capital
position, i.e., to participate in equity as opposed to debt financing; and
(2) the Bank's loans must be made either to governments directly or, if
the government is not the borrower, with the guarantee of the member
government in whose territory the project is located. Even at this early
stage, it should be mentioned that in the latter case the guaranteeing
member must assume the financial obligations of the loan as a joint
debtor; i.e., as the standard Bank agreements define it, "as primary
obligor, and not as a surety merely."
Id. art. I, § v.
The sale of participations in Bank loans performs a similar function. The aggregate amount
of participations which has been sold to institutional investors to date exceeds the equivalent of $2
billion.
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The Bank's limited ability to promote direct private investment led
to the creation of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the
Bank's first affiliate, in 1956. The IFC provides financial assistance by
direct equity investment as well as through lending or participating in
loans to private enterprise in developing countries. In other words, the
IFC cannot participate in a project that is not privately owned. It also
cannot participate in an enterprise if the member government in whose
territory the project is located fails to support it. The IFC has acted as
a catalyst for attracting a large volume of direct private participation,
both foreign and local, to the economies of its developing members. The
mining industry is an example of an area in which some of its invest-
ments and loans have been made, but even though the IFC's overall
commitments continue to expand, its financial resources compared to
the Bank's are relatively small.' This fact has required it to limit its
direct investments in any single project to between $1 million and $20
million even though the financial needs of such projects have ranged
between $100 million and $400 million. In addition, since the govern-
ment of the country in which the project is located cannot be involved
directly in IFC projects, the IFC is often not considered a suitable
vehicle for financing these types of projects. World Bank presence is at
least partially sought for its salutary effect on a partnership involving
foreign private and local public (natural) resources. The Bank's presence
is often requested as a precondition to participation by other commer-
cial lenders. However, the IFC may usefully lend its assistance to the
establishment in the developing countries of mineral processing facilities
or mining companies (by providing equity capital participation). It may
be expected to increase its involvement in this area in the future. One
of its declared policy aims is to increase the proportion of local owner-
ship of projects in which it participates.
The International Development Association (IDA), the other finan-
cial affiliate, is the last of the Group's institutions to be described.' The
IDA was created in 1960 as the "soft loan" window of the World Bank
Group. Its purpose is to provide development finance to those coun-
tries in the Group whose economies are too poor (and foreign exchange
earnings too small) to service conventional Bank loans. Unlike the Bank
or the IFC, membership in the IDA is formally and legally divided into
5 E.g., as of June 30, 1974, there was $107.2 million in share capital plus $65.3 million in reserves,
plus approximately $428 million in borrowing authority.
6 For a discussion of the Bank's nonfinancial affiliate, the ICSID, see Sassoon, The Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, I ISRAEL
L. REV. 27 (1966).
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two distinct groups. There are 21 (part I) donor countries and 95 (part
II) beneficiary countries. However, not all of the part II countries are
eligible to be beneficiaries. IDA credits require no interest, except for a
service charge of 0.75 percent on amounts withdrawn, and the IDA
allows 50 years for repayment, including a 10-year grace period. The
concessionary terms also require that the IDA obtain its resources from
donations or contributions from its more affluent members. Therefore,
the IDA depends on grants which must, of course, be appropriated from
the budgets of the donor countries. In other words, the very survival of
the IDA depends upon the allocation of tax money and other revenues
collected from the citizens of the richer countries. However, there are
many domestic needs which often seem more pressing to the average
taxpayer in the developed parts of the world than foreign aid. For this
reason the amounts at the IDA's disposal are clearly inadequate to meet
all the needs of development. Consequently, the IDA must allocate its
scarce resources rather carefully and will not be involved in mining
projects. Mining projects ought to reflect the true cost of capital and
are not economically feasible unless they generate sufficient revenues to
produce a profit on this cost. The export-oriented nature of the industry
usually means that the revenues will be in foreign exchange. As a result,
the Bank is the only substantial source of funds for these types of
projects.'
The Bank's duty to assist its member countries in their economic
development effort has already been mentioned; so has its reliance for
its resources on the private capital markets of the world. The latter aim,
quite apart from the duty towards its own shareholders to preserve their
capital and not incur losses, would be jeopardized if the Bank's lending
operations were not conducted with a great degree of caution. The
confidence of the market expresses itself in the willingness to purchase
World Bank bonds in the vast amounts which are required and at the
most advantageous interest rates prevailing at the time of issue. This
confidence would be seriously eroded if the Bank departed from the
standards of prudence and care that have characterized its operations
from its inception. The victims of any such adverse market move would
be the developing countries themselves.
I This has led to the creation of the term "enclave project." An enclave project is a project which
is outside the mainstream of economic activity in the country where it is located. It contributes to
the economy principally through royalties, taxes, and profit sharing. Consequently, these projects
are eligible for Bank financing, even when situated in IDA countries. The credit-worthiness of the
surrounding economy is immaterial because the project will generate sufficient foreign exchange
to pay for itself.
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II. PROBLEMS OF BANK PARTICIPATION IN THE MINING SECTOR
The following factors help to explain the relatively limited involve-
ment of the Bank8 in the mining sector: (1) the special features of the
mining sector, including the fact that it operates at levels of physical,
commercial, and political risk which are normally significantly higher
than those of other industries; (2) the extremely heavy investments these
projects require, including not only the physical and social infrastruc-
ture facilities, but also the early expenditures for exploration and metal-
lurgical testings; (3) the fact that much of the requisite technical exper-
tise continues to be concentrated in the hands of a relatively small
number of multinational corporations which have free access to the
capital markets of the world on their own account; (4) the fact that the
investment climate of the past was more stable in that nationalizations
and expropriations of foreign-controlled mines were less customary,
with the perceived risks being lower and thus more readily financeable
without participation of the Bank; and (5) the reluctance of previous
boards (representing the member governments) of the Bank to finance
governmentally owned and managed industrial enterprises. This latter
attitude of reluctance has long been abandoned, but it was rather preva-
lent in the early years of the Bank's operation.
Since it first entered this sector in 1957, the Bank has made some 15
loans aggregating $480.8 million for mining projects.' However, the
depletion of the existing, nonrenewable, known resources and the pro-
jected growth of demand resulting from higher living standards and
expectations, together with the new political, social, and economic reali-
ties of the world, quite clearly point to a much greater Bank effort in
this sector in the future. Indeed, an increasing role by the Bank in this
sector can be predicted with almost virtual certainty. As a rule, mining
projects in the past were financed on a project-by-project basis rather
than in the framework of a balanced sector approach. Most projects
were referred to the Bank from the outside, generally after most of the
contractual arrangements between the foreign private participants and
the host country were totally or substantially completed. This is not to
& The Bank's involvement in the mining sector is slightly less than 2.5 percent of the total Bank
Group lending.
9 The IFC has participated in seven more such projects. The projects have yielded a total of
$88.2 million. Bank Group financing has been confined to 13 countries in Africa, Asia, Central
America, and South America. There has been some financing in Europe and the Middle East. The
mineral sector makes a major contribution to the economies and exports of six of these countries:
Brazil, Chile, Gabon, Guinea, Mauritania, and the People's Republic of Congo. The Bank has also
carried out mining sector studies in other countries.
1975]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
say that the Bank accepted these contractual arrangements in every
case. Where these arrangements appeared unfair, the Bank simply re-
fused to participate in the project.
The General Counsel of the Bank has stated that the policy of the
Bank in this area is very clear, and that the Bank has no business
financing these types of projects "unless they [produce] a significant,
and in the circumstances, fair and reasonable yield to the host coun-
try." " This obviously places the Bank in a very delicate position. To
what extent should the Bank try to influence the terms and conditions
of the transaction between the private foreign investors and the host
government? Quite clearly where the safety of the Bank's own invest-
ment is concerned, the answer to this question is in the affirmative. But
how far, if at all, should the Bank go beyond that? Should the Bank act
as the advocate of the government in its negotiations with foreign inves-
tors? According to the General Counsel, the answer to this last question
is "no." However, according to the General Counsel, there is one point
of which the Bank makes quite sure; namely, that the government se-
cures competent legal and business advice. Where it feels necessary, the
Bank makes the retention of outside legal and other counsel a condition
sine qua non of its participation in mining projects. 1 Where appropri-
ate, the Bank is even willing to include the cost of such services in the
loan proceeds for the project. The Bank is never prepared to assist in
the financing of a mining project involving foreign investors unless it
first satisfies itself that the agreements governing the relationships be-
tween the parties are fair and equitable. The Bank also has to be satis-
fied that the government has available to it suitable professional advice
to assist it in negotiating the terms of the agreement. Whether the
Bank's posture in this area of agreements between foreign participants
and host governments will change and become more active in the future,
and if so, what particular form this involvement may take, remains to
be seen. If the Bank can assist in formulating an adequate mineral
policy and in accelerating developing countries' access to the relevant
expert assistance by working out the terms of potentially more durable
relationships between suppliers and consumers, it is quite possible that
the Bank would be willing to take steps in the future to become involved
in mining projects at an earlier stage than it has in the past. Certainly,
many expect that its impartial expert advice would have a salutary effect
10 Broches, The Role of the World Bank in International Transactions, in SOUTHWESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION, PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 185, 203 (V. Cameron ed. 1970).
] Id.
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in this area. As much as 80 percent of all exploration expenditure is now
being invested in the developed countries. The aggregate of non-fuel
mineral reserves (excluding the reserves found in countries with cen-
trally planned economies which contain about 30 percent of the world's
reserves) are estimated to be divided approximately evenly between
developed and developing countries. The potential of future reserves is
clearly higher in the developing countries. This disproportionate amount
of investment in the developed countries cannot last and clearly calls for
some action.
III. BANK FINANCING OF MINING PRODUCTION AND
INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES
A more detailed description of the Bank's past involvement with
mining projects is necessary. In every case the Bank looked at the
project as a whole. This was true irrespective of the portion of the
project which the Bank was asked or was willing to finance. The Bank
had to satisfy itself: (1) that the deal was fair to the member of the Bank
in whose territory the project was located (i.e., the host government);
(2) that the allocation of benefits and risks was properly balanced; (3)
that the project made economic sense; and (4) that the Bank's invest-
ment was secure. Attempts to curtail the Bank's examination of these
various aspects was attempted through the establishment of subsidiaries
with limited responsibility for only a part of the project. These attempts
were unsuccessful. The Bank was unwilling to participate in the financ-
ing of a railway or port facility (if its main purpose was to facilitate a
mining project) unless it had examined the mining aspects of the project.
The Bank insisted upon satisfying itself as to all of the above-listed
points. The same held true if the request was to finance a township
associated with a mining development. Because of this analysis of the
entire deal or transaction, the actual part of the project which the Bank
financed was immaterial. The identity of the borrower was normally
immaterial also.
The Bank has financed infrastructure facilities as well as mining pro-
duction facilities. Whether or not it would finance infrastructure facili-
ties depended upon the particular circumstances. The Bank has lent to
a private corporation, when it was the project entity, as well as to a host
government or one of its agencies. Of the 22 projects financed by the
Bank Group to date, four of the loans financed infrastructure facilities,
while 11 financed production facilities. The remainder financed both
production and infrastructure facilities. IFC finance was exclusively for
private enterprise. Bank loans were made equally to both the private and
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government sectors, although in the majority of projects, control of the
mines was in private hands. However, the government may wish to
avoid the concentration of ownership of all the facilities in one hand for
fear of impeding further development. This often explains the host gov-
ernment's desire to assume direct responsibility for the infrastructure.
The Bank does have certain preferences in these areas. It prefers to
lend directly to the entity or enterprise which will be responsible for the
construction and operation of the project in order to avoid the danger
that shortcomings and problems in the execution of the project might
not be remedied immediately. Since experience has shown that physical
or administrative distance may hinder or delay corrective steps, the
Bank prefers to have as close a relationship as possible with the project
and with those responsible for its construction and operation. If the
project is to be carried out by a private corporation, then the guarantee
of the host country, which is required by the Bank's articles, will nor-
mally be confined to the payment of the debt service on the loan. This
is true even when there is some governmental participation in owner-
ship if the private character of the corporation is essentially unaltered.
This is typically the case when the governmental participation is in
consideration for the grant of a mining concession to the enterprise.
The host country's guarantee will not extend to the full performance
of the borrower's undertakings. The guarantee will also not extend to
the provision of the funds and other facilities required to complete the
project. The latter is the case when the loan is made to a state corpora-
tion or enterprise with the guarantee of the member. In such an arrange-
ment, all the guarantor government will usually be requested to cove-
nant is "not to take, cause, or permit to be taken any action which
would prevent or interfere with the construction and operation of the
project or with the performance of the borrower's obligations." This
principle of operations is a general practice of the Bank. The choice of
borrower under the loan in question will thus be resolved by reference
to the particular portion of the project which the Bank is asked to
finance and is willing to finance.
Under its Articles of Agreement, the Bank is normally required to
finance the foreign exchange cost of projects. Financing of local cost
expenditures is only permitted in exceptional circumstances. For this
reason, the Bank's participation in projects which require large foreign
exchange expenditures will usually be confined to the financing of im-
ported equipment and materials. Mining projects in the less developed
countries almost always fall into this category. As this may to some
extent have a bearing on the portion of the project that the Bank is
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willing to finance, it is also a factor to bear in mind with respect to the
choice of borrower. In other words, since the Bank is more likely to
participate in financing the importation of large pieces of equipment
connected with a mining development than to participate in the financ-
ing of local labor costs, its participation may be directed to that portion
of the project where such items are concentrated. When other lenders
whose aid might be tied are involved, the range of options might not
always be as broad as would be desirable. However, beyond these con-
siderations, there is no relevance as to what portion of the project is
being financed by the Bank in terms of the Bank's interest in the project
as a whole.
Assuming that the Bank is willing to finance any or all of the power,
water, township, or transportation infrastructure of a mining project, it
would still wish to examine in the greatest possible detail a number of
arrangements. These arrangements relate to production, marketing,
security, risks, and the sharing of benefits (whatever their particular
form-taxes, royalties, dividends, employment opportunities, etc.), and
to the management of the entire operation. Ecological and environmen-
tal safeguards are also considered. This was the Bank's practice in the
following projects: (1) the Falconbridge ferronickel mine in the Domini-
can Republic (financing of power facilities); (2) the Miferma iron-ore
project in Mauritania (financing of railway and port facilities); (3) the
Comilog Manganese project in Gabon and Congo/Brazzaville (financ-
ing of cableway and railway facilities); and (4) the Camel liquified gas
project in Algeria (financing of port and power facilities in addition to
a liquification plant). These are only a few examples. In all of these
cases the loans were made directly to the mining company. However,
the same was equally true of the following projects: (1) the Burfell power
project in Iceland (serving the Alusuisse aluminum smelter); (2) the
Volta power project in Ghana (serving the Valco aluminum smelter); (3)
the Boke railway, port, and township project in Guinea (serving the
bauxite mining operation of an international consortium of alumium
companies); (4) the Shashi power, water, railway, and township project
in Botswana (serving the nickel and copper mining operation of BCL,
a subsidiary of Roan Selection Trust); and (5) the REFFSA Minaes
Gerais-Sepatiba Bay railway link in Brazil (serving the MBR iron-ore
mine). The loans in the Brazilian project were made to the host country
government or to one of its agencies which was responsible for the
operation of the infrastructure facilities in question. Admittedly, these
two forms of financing (i.e., direct financing of the project entity and
indirect financing of the supporting outside infrastructure facilities) in-
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volve different legal and financial problems and techniques, but the
choice of one or the other form is essentially irrelevant to the Bank's
evaluation of the project as a whole.
IV. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
In all of the cases noted above, the companies operating the mining
facilities were the real parties to which the Bank looked for assumption
of the risk and for security of its loan repayment. Where the borrower
was a project entity which was privately owned, substantial shareholder
equity or subordinated debt was required for the financing. Normally,
shareholder guarantees for cost overruns and repayment were also
sought. These usually included financial commitments to provide all
funds necessary to complete the project and repay the loan. Obviously,
these commitments are quite apart from other more customary types
of security, such as plant mortgages etc. In the case of the Shashi proj-
ect in Botswana, the private party was required to assume one-half of
the cost of the engineering studies of the water, power, transport, and
township facilities, which had been financed under a $2.5 million IDA
credit to the government. This was done in case the private party failed
to proceed with the mining project. In addition, the Bank has insisted
for some time now that in all nongovernmental projects the private bor-
rower not be given the advantage of the Bank's subsidized lending rate.
Rather, the Bank requires that the host government charge the private
investors a guarantee fee equal to the difference between the market rate
of money and the Bank's current lending rate. The Bank's practice is
to charge a uniform lending rate which is kept as low as is consistent
with its own financial well-being. There is no reason to give the benefit
of this low long-term rate to a private investor. The low rate was de-
signed to lighten the burden that the financing of economic development
places upon the balance-of-payments positions of Bank members. Thus,
the Bank has insisted that the host government charge the project entity
a guarantee fee. On the other hand, if the loan was made to the govern-
ment or to one of its agencies in support of a mining venture, the lending
rate was the usual uniform low rate, because the direct beneficiary of
the loan was the government itself. But this does not mean that the Bank
looked to the government as the real provider of the funds to cover the
debt service of the loan. In all of these cases, since the infrastructure
facilities in question were designed to service the mining operation or
enterprise, the Bank insisted that adequate arrangements be made.
These arrangements ensured that the government had a sufficient source
of revenue from the private participants in the mining venture. This was
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in consideration for the government's investment through the World
Bank loan in the infrastructure supporting facilities. The government
needed a sufficient source of revenue not only to repay its obligations
to the Bank, but also to justify the entire investment.
Security arrangements in these cases have also taken other forms.
The Bank has occasionally insisted on obtaining liens or pledges which
could be enforced directly against third parties who were, for example,
to be the purchasers of the produce. Shareholder guarantees running
directly to the Bank are also in this category, because the Bank can
enforce them as a party to the contract in question. When the Bank is
not a party to the arrangement, the security will run directly from the
consumer or from the shareholders to the borrower. These arrange-
ments do not involve a right which the Bank can enforce directly, but
in effect they produce a somewhat similar financial guarantee for the
borrower.
From a legal point of view, a distinction can clearly be made between
arrangements which give the Bank direct rights and remedies against a
third party (i.e., one other than the borrower) and those arrangements
which do not establish a direct contractual relationship between the
Bank and a third party. The distinction is financially less significant.
This is because arrangements of the second kind, by aiming at strength-
ening or safeguarding the financial position of the borrower, also con-
tribute, even if more indirectly, to the protection of the Bank's invest-
ment.
Such arrangements are best illustrated by examples. A company
wanted to borrow funds for a large power project. Most of its output
was to be sold to two other power companies in a neighboring state.
Apart from the fact that the buyers might have been financially stronger
than the producer, the success of the entire project depended on the sales
actually taking place under terms foreseen at the time the loan was
made. The buying companies committed themselves to take a certain
quantity of the power production. They also undertook to pay the pro-
ducing company for its annual production costs, including interest pay-
ments, depreciation, taxes, and even a certain return on share capital.
The unusual feature of this arrangement was that the consumers were
paying for their energy not on the basis of units purchased but on a
prorated share of the cost of production. These obligations were uncon-
ditional, and the sales contracts which contained them were assigned to
the Bank as security for its loan.
The assignment of a "take-or-pay" long-term purchase contract is a
form of security arrangement which is frequently encountered in the
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type of loans under discussion. It consists of the obligation of a third
party to purchase a product or service, or to pay for it even if it is not
purchased. In some cases the obligation to pay exists even if the product
involved has not been produced. The third parties involved may be the
shareholders of the borrower, as in the Falconbridge project. In other
instances they are outsiders interested in a steady supply of the product.
In yet other examples, it may be the private mining company who agrees
to pay for transportation and for other infrastructure facilities which the
government provides by means of the Bank loan (as was the case in the
MBR iron-ore project in Brazil). 2 In some cases payments for the
service or the product in question are made to a trustee who must
earmark and apportion the receipts between the various creditors, in-
cluding the government, in accordance with the priorities which have
been agreed upon. This must be done before the trustee can transfer any
money to the private producer. There is no established pattern and each
individual case is governed by its own circumstances.
One of the Bank loans was an interesting case in which two "take-
or-pay" agreements were involved. The borrower was a government-
owned power agency. A large part of its output was to be used by a
foreign-owned company for its aluminum smelter. The company under-
took to buy a set quantity of power at set minimum prices. The share-
holders of the company also committed themselves to supply it with the
raw materials for processing and to pay a processing charge based upon
a percentage of the world market price for aluminum. In the event that
the charges for aluminum actually processed did not cover the smelting
company's operating costs, including debt service and power payment
obligations, the shareholders were to make a minimum quarterly pay-
ment to the company sufficient to meet these operating costs. This case
provides an interesting example of arrangements that pierce the screen
of existing corporate structures by involving the real economic forces
behind the project, its promoters, and sponsors.
The foregoing examples demonstrate that the form of security varies
from transaction to transaction, depending on the individual character-
istics of the project, and will most probably be different where the loan
is made to a private entity, rather than to the government or to one of
its agencies. No matter what form the particular security takes, the
infrastructure, if publicly owned, will have to be secured by the mining
1 In the Shashi project in Botswana, the private mining company was required to pay a mini-
mum monthly payment to cover loan authorization, operating costs, and return for the power and
water. A similar formula for the other infrastructure services and facilities, whether supplied or
not, was established.
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operation and its sponsors. The obligation of the government as a bor-
rower or guarantor in these cases will protect the Bank's loan, but this
protection is in addition to, and not in lieu of, the security which the
private investors must furnish. In effect, the specific security arrange-
ments are designed to protect the government as guarantor, or as bor-
rower, as much as they are designed to protect the Bank as lender. This
is because there is less likelihood of the Bank having to invoke the
government's direct obligation in these circumstances. As already
noted, it is for this reason that such projects can receive Bank rather
than IDA financing, even though the country itself may normally have
access to IDA funds only. Even in the unlikely circumstance of the Bank
having to enforce the government's direct obligation, the government
will then be subrogated to the rights and benefits of the security arrange-
ments in question. Naturally, private parties furnishing such security
want to be free from their commitment in the event that government
interference causes the need to enforce the security in the first place. In
other words, they insist on limiting their obligations to cover technical
or commercial risks. Understandably, they will refuse to accept or to
underwrite the political risks, especially if they emanate from the host
government itself.
Here we tread on delicate ground. The subject is known in Bank
parlance as the force majeure exception and in fact explains some of the
Bank's prior involvement in the mining sector. The reason for request-
ing the Bank's financial participation in these cases was frequently not
lack of money. The mining companies could have probably raised the
money on their own. Rather, the object was to facilitate the raising
of capital via the presence of the World Bank in the deal, which was
sought for what might be termed as its stablizing influence. This is an
influence which is often sought by host governments requesting Bank
involvement in their mineral sector because of the useful role they expect
the Bank to play in any conflict which may develop between them and
the mining companies. Thus, although World Bank Group lending has
accounted for less than 1.5 percent of the total flow of funds into the
developing countries for mineral projects, the Bank has been involved
in projects involving 6 to 8 percent of total mineral expenditures, and
has contributed between 20 and 25 percent of the cost of those projects
for the period from 1957 to the present. The buffer or umbrella presence
of the Bank is designed to give the project a measure of political stability
and to restrain the government from taking any actions in violation of
its project undertakings that would make the government bear the brunt
of repayment. This is because the security required of the private inves-
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tors cannot be invoked when the investors are deprived of the benefits
they had planned to derive from operating the project, if deprivation
occurs via an act of the host government or through acts of revolution
or war. 13 Therefore, many of these security arrangements contain Jorce
majeure exceptions releasing the private parties from their obligations
to supply funds, regardless of the particular technique used, for cost
overruns or repayment of the loan capital in the event of political inter-
ference.
No description of the Bank's practice in this area would be complete
without mentioning at least some of the differences which distinguish
loans to private parties from loans to the government or one of its
agencies in the mining sector. Where the borrower is a private corpora-
tion, its debt/equity ratio may be subject to limitations imposed by the
Bank. A restriction is normally placed on shareholder dividends or on
interest on shareholder advances. A commitment to keep working capi-
tal at adequate levels is often obtained. Substantial equity or other
subordinated financial investment participation by the private share-
holders is required. All of these covenants do not apply in the case of
loans which are made to governments or to governmental agencies that
are involved in providing mining infrastructure facilities with the assis-
tance of Bank financing. In fact, liens on specific revenues or assets as
security for loans which are valid against third parties will usually not
be sought from governments or governmental agencies. Such liens will
generally not be sought unless another creditor or lender participating
in the financing has obtained such a security, or unless the specific
assets, even though not encumbered, would be reachable outside the
member country by another creditor. As mentioned earlier, a typical
form of security that the Bank seeks in lending to a private investor in
the mining sector is precisely of this kind; namely, a shareholder's com-
mitment to the Bank or an assignment to the Bank of a contract to take
or pay for the produce of the mine.
On the other hand, all loans to governments have contained negative
pledge clauses. These are agreements that if the government creates any
specific lien or pledge on any of its revenues or property to secure any
other external debt, the Bank will have a right to share in such security
pari passu. However, this principle is applied by the Bank, without
exception, to all of its loans to members and guarantees of members,
regardless of the type of project for which the Bank's assistance is given.
11 These are risks which the private investor and his commercial lenders would normally seek
to protect against by means of national investment guarantee programs.
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It is the Bank's usual policy not to require specific security for its loans
to governments or governmental agencies. It normally permits the gov-
ernments to borrow on the basis of their general credit. On the other
hand, the Bank does not wish other lenders to take specific security or
to acquire preferences or priorities of payment which could put the Bank
in a subordinate position. Nor does the Bank wish to make payment to
the Bank more difficult than payment to another creditor. Therefore,
the Bank includes in its agreements with members a "negative pledge"
provision which assures it of equal and pari passu treatment if specific
security or preference is later given to another lender. The Bank has
sometimes agreed to waive the right to participate in a security by virtue
of the negative pledge undertaking if the circumstances justified such a
waiver. However, it would be less than prudent, and it could weaken the
Bank's position in the capital markets of the world, thereby resulting
in a rise in the cost of its own borrowing. Ultimately, this would also
lend to an increase in its lending rate if it did not pursue the practice of
including a negative pledge covenant in its agreements with govern-
ments.
V. CONCLUSION
So much for current practice. What of the future? As already inti-
mated, a growing and larger Bank role and a noticeable increase in
financing projects in this sector may be expected. There will probably
be more emphasis on local participation and on the fairness and open-
ness of the agreements governing the relations between the foreign and
local participants. This emphasis will probably involve different legal
and financial problems from those described, but these problems should
not pose any real difficulties and the appropriate techniques will be
found. But this will also entail the assumption of greater risks on behalf
of already overstrained economies. For example, the high cost of explo-
ration is often wasted, since there is no assurance that a commercially
exploitable discovery will result. Returns usually take many years to be
realized. It would be irresponsible to focus attention only on the profits
of successful ventures without taking into account the potential for
losses and the grave risks involved. The bargaining power and the geo-
logical and technological knowledge of the producing countries must be
strengthened. The promotion of adequate mineral policies and explora-
tion work must be accelerated so that the economic and social benefits
of successful operations might be realized more quickly. This would
conform more closely to the expectations of the people who are fortun-
ate enough to possess mineral wealth within their lands. If the problems
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which now beset the industry are to be solved, and they are essentially
political in nature, a closer partnership between producers and consum-
ers must be forged.
